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COMMENTS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY FOR ASSAULT AND BAT-
TERY COMMITTED BY ONE EMPLOYEE ON ANOTHER EMPLOYEE
Two workers, engaged in laying a concrete floor, were waiting
for the mixer to be refilled. On being struck by an empty
cigarette package thrown by his co-worker, Pittman tossed a
small pebble at him and returned to his wheelbarrow. His co-
worker, being hit on the neck, became angry and struck Pittman
a blow on the back of the head with his shovel, causing a frac-
tured skull and permanent brain injury. In Pittman's suit under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission allowed recovery, and this award was upheld by the
circuit court. On appeal, held: affirmed. An assault and battery
by one employee upon another is one of the hazards of the em-
ployment; therefore, the injury resulting arose out of and in the
course of employment.'
The Mississippi Compensation Act, as typical of the statutes
in a majority of the states,2 requires that the injury must arise
"out of and in the course of employment.' 3 The courts have made
a distinction between the phrases "arising out of" and "in the
course of employment," the former involving an idea of causal
relationship between the employment and the injury and the
latter referring to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the injury occurred. 4 The court in the principal case, taking an
approach like that of other tribunals which have been confronted
with this particular fact situation,5 did not discuss the question
of whether the resulting injury occurred in the course of the
employment. Such an approach, however, seems reasonable, un-
der the above definition of the phrase, in view of the fact that
both men were on the job at the time of the assault.
There is, however, a clear conflict of authority on the question
of whether an injury suffered under the precise facts of the
instant case is one which arose out of the employment. At the
1. Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 So.2d 547
(Miss. 1952).
2. 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT § 1542 (Permanent ed.
1948); 58 AM. JuR., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 209.
3. Miss. Laws 1948, c. 354.
4. 6 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1542(b); Am. JUI., WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 210.
5. See, e.g., ,artford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Zackery, 69 Ga. App.
250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943) ; Urak v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb. 411, 186 N.W.
345 (1922); Mountain Ice Co. v. McNeil, 91 N.J.L. 528, 103 Atl. 184 (1918);
Gory v. Monarch Mills, 208 S.C. 86, 37 S.E.2d 291 (1946).
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outset, it should be noted that the principal case is to be dis-
tinguished from that situation where the assault grew out of an
argument over the performance of the work or the possession
of equipment used in the work, in which case the authorities are
generally agreed that there should be compensation., Here the
assault was not the result of a dispute concerning the execution
of the work, and the decision on the issue of recovery in such a
factual situation has depended on whether the particular court
has adopted a strict or liberal construction of the phrase "arising
out of the employment."'7 The majority of the courts has taken a
conservative approach which requires that the causative danger
be inherently or essentially connected with the employment ;8 and,
under this general principle, assaults made solely to gratify a
feeling of anger or hatred have not been deemed to be so con-
nected with the employment.9 On the other hand, the minority
courts have fostered a more liberal view based upon the position
and activities of the claimant rather than upon the motivation of
the assailant. 10 The test applied by one of the liberal courts is
not whether the injury was caused by something peculiar to the
employment, but whether the risk from which the injury resulted
was greater for the workman than for others not engaged in the
6. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 11.12 (1952).
7. Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 So.2d 547, 548
(Miss. 1952).
8. For a collection of the cases which verbalize their rulings in this man-
ner, see 58 Am. JUR., WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 211. Exemplary cases in
point with the instant case are: Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Zackery, 69 Ga. App. 250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943) ; Chicago Hardware Voundry
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 393 Ill. 294, 65 N.E.2d 778 (1946); Chicago
v. Industrial Commission, 292 Ill. 406, 127 N.E. 49 (1920).
9. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Zachery, 69 Ga. App. 250, 25
S.E.2d 135 (1943); Chicago Foundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 393 Ill.
294, 65 N.E.2d 778 (1946); Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 Ill. 406,
127 N.E. 49 (1920); Lardge v. Concrete Products Mfg. Co., 251 S.W.2d 49
(Mo. 1952); Urak v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb. 411, 186 N.W. 345 (1922);
Mountain Ice Co. v. McNeil, 91 N.J.L. 528, 103 Atl. 184 (1918); Gory v.
Monarch Mills, 208 S.C. 86, 37 S.E.2d 291 (1946) ; accord, Texas Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); cf. Monte v.
General Motors Corp., 24 N.J. Misc. 383, 49 A.2d 591 (C.P. 1946).
10. Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101 So. 248
(1924); Stasmas v. State Industrial Commission, 80 Okla. 221, 195 Pac. 762
(1921). New York, despite one result to the contrary, also has adopted the
liberal approach. Compare Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern & Son, Inc., 229
N.Y. 192, 128 N.E. 126 (1920) (liberal result) and Humphrey v. Tietjen &
Steffen Milk Co., 235 App. Div. 470, 257 N.Y. Supp. 768 (3rd Dep't 1932),
aff'd without opinion, 261 N.Y. 549, 185 N.E. 733 (1933) (liberal result),
with Scholtzhauer v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 233 N.Y. 12, 134 N.E. 701 (1922)
(liberal phraseology but conservative result).
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employment."' Other American courts apparently have adopted
the even more liberal "position and locality" test, which has been
expressed in the leading English case of Thorn or Simpson v.
Sinclair.12 This rule makes the injury an incident of the job
where the worker is required to be in a place which turns out to
be dangerous. The liability of injury inflicted by co-employees
is considered, under both liberal views, as one of the risks in-
volved in the employment."
In holding that the employment brought Pittman and his assail-
ant into close contact and that one of the hazards of this contact
was that an assault might take place, the court in the principal
case apparently adopted the test of Thorn or Simpson v. Sinclair.
Because of the two decisions by the Mississippi court in the case
of Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts,14 however, it cannot be
categorically stated that Mississippi has the liberal view. In that
case a laundryman, who was having illicit relations with a cus-
tomer's wife regularly, was shot by the woman's husband while
making one of his stops at the customer's house. In its first de-
cision on that set of facts, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled
that, since the work brought the worker within the orbit of
danger, personal motives did not break the causal relation be-
tween the employment and the injury. Later, however, the court
reversed its first decision and argued that the mere fact the
worker was on the job and would not have been injured had he
not been so employed did not show a causal connection between
11. Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101 So. 248
(1924).
12. [1917] A.C. 127. The American courts which seemed to have adopted
the Thorn or Simpson v. Sinclair test are New York and Oklahoma. See
Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern & Son, Inc., 229 N.Y. 192, 128 N.E. 126 (1920) ;
Humphrey v. Tietjen & Steffen Milk Co., 235 App. Div. 470, 257 N.Y. Supp.
768 (3rd Dep't 1932), aff'd without opinion, 261 N.Y. 549, 185 N.E. 733
(1933); Stasmas v. State Industrial Commission, 80 Okla. 221, 195 Pac.
762 (1921). It is interesting to note, however, that the test applied in the
one English case in point with the principal case and subsequent to Thorn
or Simpson v. Sinclair appears to have been verbalized along the lines of
the rule adopted in the case of Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156
La. 871, 101 So. 248 (1924). In Parker v. Federal Steam Navigation Co.,
95 L.J.K.B. 664, 665 (C.A. 1925), Atkin, L.J., felt that the basic issue in
such a case was whether the danger of assault was merely one which was
common to anyone equally with the person who suffered the assault or
whether there was some special risk (f assault to the particular person
arising from 4js employment. The latter question having been answered in
the affirmative, compensation was awarded for the injury as one arising out
of the employment.
13. See notes 10, 11, 12 supra.
14. 55 So.2d 381 (Miss. 1951), rev'd, 59 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1952).
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the employment and the injury. Granting that the fact situations
were not identical, the contrast in the language used in the prin-
cipal case and that used in'the second Brookhaven decision seems
clearly, on the basis of the above discussion, to impart two differ-
ent approaches. 15 The difficult problem of delineating the limits
of the area of liability, which is often discussed in terms of causa-
tion, seems again to have produced inconsistent rulings.
15. Roberds, J., dissenting in the principal case, realized the inconsistency
referred to in the text. He describes the stand of the court in the instant
case as follows:
We have crossed the Rubicon. The Court has now held that every
employer, who is within the Workmen's Compensation Act is liable
for every injury inflicted by one employee on a co-employee while work-
ing together at the place of work, even though the injury results from
personal malice on the part of the wrongdoer towards the injured
employee. There is no claim here that the injury arose out of the
employment other than in the sense that both were employed and were
* working at, or about, the same place. In other words, every employer
is the guarantor against eccentricities, habits, temperament, disposi-
tion, inclinations, emotions, and foolish whims of all of his employees.
With deference to my brethren I do not think the phrase "arising out
of * * * employment," as used in the Act, means that, nor that the
Legislature intended for it to mean that.
So far as this Court is concerned we have settled upon the definition
of that meaning in the opinion this day handed down sustaining a sug-
gestion of error in the case of Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts,
Miss., 59 So.2d 294. I can do no better than to quote what we there
say: [The following quotation from the second Brookhaven case is
itself a quotation from 6 SCHNEDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT
§ 1542 (b) (Permanent ed. 1948)]
...The fact that one is working at the tilme he is injured, and
would not have suffered injury had he not been employed, does not
show a causal connection between the employment and the injury, nor
will a showing that the employment brought the party to the place
where injured and that he would not have met with the accident else-
where show a proximate causal relation between the employment and
the injury. The risk must be reasonably incidental to the employ-
ment * * *. There must be some connection between the injury and
the employment other than the mere fact that the employment brought
the injured party to the place of injury.
Mutual implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 59 So.2d 547, 556, 557
(Miss. 1952).
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